This paper considers an individual making a treatment choice. The individual has access to data on other individuals, with values for a list of characteristics, treatment assignments, and outcomes. The individual knows his value for the list of characteristics. The goal is to use this data set to guide his treatment choice. The role of treatment assignment is developed, and how it affects the specification of prior distributions. The likelihood function is the same for random assignment and for selection on observables, but the prior distributions differ. A question here is whether there is a value in knowing the propensity score. The propensity score does not appear in the likelihood, but it does appear in the prior distribution. So there is a value to knowing the propensity score if the prior is not dominated by the data. In particular, the list of measured characteristics may be of high dimension, and the paper considers prior distributions that may be effective in this case.
INTRODUCTION
Data are available on N individuals. For individual i, we observe a vector of discrete characteristics, which is coded as X i ∈ {1, . . . , K}. There is assignment to one of two treatments:
There is a discrete outcome, which is coded as Y i ∈ {1, . . . , J}. We shall work in an expected utility framework:
The notation allows for additional consequences of the choice that are known to the decision maker, such as costs c 0 and c 1 . Then we could have u l (·) = u(·, c l ) for l = 0, 1. We shall take the utility function (u 0 (·), u 1 (·)) for α as given, and focus on the expectation. So we need to construct conditional distributions for Y α0 and for Y α1 , conditional on the observation Z.
An immediate issue is that we do not observe (Y i0 , Y i1 ) for the individuals in the data set (i = 1, . . . , N ). Suppose that i is sufficiently similar to α so that we can think about i making a choice between the two treatments, even though the actual assignment of D i may not have been through such a choice. For example, the actual value of D i may have been randomly assigned.
Define Y i0 as the outcome if i chooses treatment 0, and Y i1 as the outcome if i chooses treatment 1. We think about these decision outcomes in the same way that we think about Y α0 and Y α1 in the decision-maker's problem. Now it becomes a key assumption that if
regardless of how this assignment of D i = 0 came to be. So we are saying that the outcome that is observed when i is assigned to treatment 0 is the same as the outcome that would be observed if i had chosen treatment 0. With a corresponding assumption for treatment 1, we have
To appreciate the force of these assumptions, suppose that immediately after treatment assignment, individual i can at some cost change the assignment. This is not relevant for unconstrained choice, but if i is assigned to treatment 0 when he would have chosen treatment 1, then this option may become relevant and the observed outcome may differ from Y i0 . More generally, if i is assigned a treatment that differs from what he would have chosen, then various actions may become relevant, even though they are not relevant for the unconstrained choice of the decision-maker α.
Section 2 develops a likelihood function for the case of selection on observables, and then makes the stronger assumption of random assignment in setting up prior distributions. If the number of values K for X i is large, with a small number of observations in a typical X i = k cell, then the prior distribution plays an important role and is not dominated by the data. Section 3 relaxes the random assignment assumption, maintaining selection on observables. This does not affect the likelihood function but does affect the prior distributions. A question here is whether there is a value in knowing the propensity score. The propensity score does not appear in the likelihood, but it does appear in the prior distribution. So there is a value to knowing the propensity score if the prior is not dominated by the data. This would be the case if the number of values for X i is large, with a small number of observations in a typical X i = k cell.
Section 4 considers selection on unobservables. We simplify notation by dropping the X variable. Either there are no observable characteristics for the data individuals or we work with a subset that matches the decision maker. There is, however, an additional vector of discrete variables, which is coded as W i ∈ {1, . . . , M }. W i plays the role of an instrumental variable.
The prior distribution is not dominated by the data. We make a particular suggestion, in which the undominated part of the prior shows up in the choice of a functional form, which is then combined with a maximum-likelihood approximation to obtain a decision rule. We discuss the role of extrapolation in this decision rule by making a connection with compliers, always-takers, and never-takers in the local average treatment effect developed by Imbens and Angrist (1994) .
Section 5 makes connections with the literature. 
RANDOM ASSIGNMENT
where S J−1 is the unit simplex of dimension J − 1 in R J .
Likelihood Function
Let z denote the realization of the random variable Z,
and let θ = (π, η). The likelihood function for the observation Z is
where
The value of X α for the decision maker is τ . Suppose that the following sequence of random variables is exchangeable:
Then the F * distribution of Y i0 conditional on X i = τ is relevant for the decision maker, and we shall assume that:
Likewise,
Then, conditional on θ, the decision rule is to choose
We need to obtain a distribution on Θ conditional on the observation Z, in order to go from (3) to a decision rule that conditions only on the observation, as in (1).
Note that the likelihood function depends upon π only through (π 0j (k, 0), π 1j (k, 1)) for j = 1, . . . , J and k = 1, . . . , K. So there is no direct information in the data on the terms π 0j (τ, 1)
and π 1j (τ, 0) in (3). A tractable special case restricts the F * distribution so that the treatment assignment D i is independent of the decision outcomes (Y i0 , Y i1 ) conditional on the measured characteristics X i . In that case, we have
and
Now the decision rule in (3) becomes: conditional on θ,
where the operator E i provides the expectation with respect to the personal (subjective) distribution
is independent of (Y i0 , Y i1 ) conditional on X i and π. For example, we could have
More generally, (4) will hold if the information available to individual i is independent of (Y i0 , Y i1 ) conditional on X i and π. The assumption in (4) is commonly referred to as "selection on observables" or "random assignment conditional on X." We shall use those terms, but note that although X is observable, we are also conditioning on π. This conditioning on π will play an important role when we discuss prior distributions.
Limited Information
Let π l (k) = (π l1 (k), . . . , π lJ (K)) and π l = (π l (1), . . . , π l (K)) for l = 0, 1. The task of specifying a prior distribution will be easier if we can work with the marginal distributions for π 0 and π 1 without specifying the joint distribution for π = (π 0 , π 1 ). We can do this by adopting a limited information approach. Let
N ) for l = 0, 1. We shall condition on Z
in forming a (predictive) distribution for Y α0 and condition on Z (1) in forming a (predictive) distribution for Y α1 . So our limited information decision rule is
The likelihood function for
and the likelihood function for
Next we shall develop prior distributions that allow us to go from (3 ) to decision rules that depend only on the observation Z and the prior distribution.
Prior Distributions
We shall begin with a prior distribution that leads to a closed-form expression for the decision rule. Impose the restriction in (4) on the likelihood function, corresponding to random assignment conditional on X. Let
so that Θ 1 = Θ 10 × Θ 11 . Let T 0 denote a random variable that has the prior distribution on Θ 10 and let T 1 denote a random variable that has the prior distribution on Θ 11 . We shall use the limited information approach, so that we only specify the marginal distributions for T 0 and for T 1 , and do not specify a joint distribution for
, and
N ). We shall work with the distribution of Y (0) conditional on (X, D), so the distribution of D conditional on X will not play a role, and we can set the parameter space equal to Θ 10 . We shall combine the distribution of
The distributions for T 0 and
) can fail to be independent conditional on X i because D helps to predict T . For example, if
for (w 1 , . . . , w J ) in the simplex S J−1 and ζ j > 0.
The conditional density of (6) and (7) with p l (π l | x, d; β l ) from (8) shows that the conditional density is a product of Dirichlet densities:
Applying iterated expectations, we can go from the decision rule in (3 ) to the limited information rule in (1 ), that depends only upon the observation and the prior distribution:
So evaluating the conditional expectations in (10) gives the decision rule
with
Here the conditional probabilities that Y 0α = j and Y 1α = j in (3 ) are replaced by sample frequencies. For a given utility function (u 0 , u 1 ), the approximation in (12) coincides with the rule in (11) if β lj (τ )/n(l, τ, j) is sufficiently small (l = 0, 1; j = 1, . . . , J). On the other hand, for given values
, there can, depending on the utility function, be extreme sensitivity to the prior distribution. Suppose, for example, that n(0, τ ) = n(1, τ ) ≡ n(τ ), so that there are the same number of observations with D i = 0 and with D i = 1 in the cell with
If β 0 (τ )/n(τ ) and β 1 (τ )/n(τ ) are sufficiently small, then the sign of this term is determined by the sign of
(provided that (13) is nonzero). If there are no observations with X i = τ and Y i = j, then n(0, τ, j) = n(1, τ, j) = 0 and, if β 0j (τ ) = β 1j (τ ), the sign is determined by
If the absolute value of u 1 (j) is sufficiently large relative to |u 1 (j) − u 0 (j)|, then this sign will determine whether the decision rule in (11) chooses D α = 1 or D α = 0. This could correspond to a rare event that is a catastrophe when it occurs.
If the number of values K for X i is large, with a small number of observations in a typical X i = k cell, then we can expect sensitivity to the prior even if the total number N of observations is large. It may be fruitful to consider putting more structure on the prior distribution. One possibility is to treat the distributions for different values of k as identical, so that
This would be compelling if the labels k had no content, implying exchangeability over k for T 0 (k) and for T 1 (k). Let β = (β 1 , β 2 ) with β l = (β l1 , . . . , β lJ ) for l = 0, 1.
Following Good (1965, p. 28) , we can consider putting a prior distribution on the Dirichlet parameter β. Following our limited information approach, we shall only need the marginal distribution for β l (l = 0, 1) and not the joint distribution for (β 1 , β 2 ). As β l varies, we generate a set of distributions for
The densities of these conditional distributions form a Type II likelihood function for β l :
The (Type II) parameter space is
where R + is the positive real line.
Let Q l denote a random variable that has the prior distribution on Λ l . Suppose that the prior
This conditional density for Q l given Z (l) = z (l) can be combined with the conditional density for
which can be used to calculate
A potential approximation to this rule can be based on the maximum-likelihood (Type II) estimate of β l :β l = arg max
, which is a product of Dirichlet densities. The corre-
The approximation to the decision rule in (17) is
SELECTION ON OBSERVABLES
Now consider relaxing the restriction that the prior distribution on Θ 1l conditional on (X, D)
= (x, d) does not depend upon (x, d) for l = 0, 1. We will maintain the assumption in (4) of selection on observables, so that the assignment D i is independent of the potential outcomes (Y 0i , Y 1i ) conditional on the measured characteristics X i and on π. The parameter space for θ l = (π l , η)
denote a random variable that has the prior distribution on Θ 1l × Θ 2 . We shall continue to use the limited information approach, in order to avoid having to specify a joint distribution for T = (T 1 , T 2 ). The assumption of selection on observables is implicitly conditioning on π as well as X. If we do not condition on T = π, then D i and (Y i0 , Y i1 ) can fail to be independent conditional on X i because D helps to predict S, which is related to T . D and T are independent conditional on X and S, but in general we want to allow T and S to be correlated.
So we specify that the distribution of T l conditional on (X = x, D = d, ; S = η) does not depend upon (x, d) but may depend upon η. The distribution has density p T l | S which specifies that (T l (k) : k = 1, . . . , K) are mutually independent with distributions in the Dirichlet family,
for l = 0, 1, where β lj (k, ·) is a function mapping [0, 1] into the positive real line, and h Dir (· | ζ) is the Dirichlet density with parameter ζ.
As above, the conditional density of T l given (
for l = 0, 1, wherē
The corresponding decision rule, given (β 0 , β 1 , η), is
We can still consider using the decision rule in (12) as an approximation, in which the conditional probabilities that Y 0α = j and Y 1α = j in (3 ) are replaced by sample frequencies. For a given utility function (u 0 , u 1 ), the approximation in (12) coincides with the rule in (21) if β 0 (τ, η(τ ))/n(0, τ ) and β 1 (τ, η(τ ))/n(1, τ ) are sufficiently small, where
Known Propensity Score
Now suppose that the prior is not dominated by the data. There may, for example, be a large number K of values for X i , with a small number of observations in a typical X i = k cell. We shall assume initially that η is known, so that the propensity score,
is given. Then we can build on the results for this case when we introduce a prior distribution for η.
Suppose that β lj (k, ·) does not depend upon k and has the following form:
where r : j = 1, . . . , J; m = 1, . . . , O} for l = 0, 1. We can form a Type II likelihood function for
for l = 0, 1. The (Type II) parameter space is
Given a prior distribution for β l , we can form a decision rule. A potential approximation to that rule can be based on the maximum-likelihood (Type II) estimate of β l :
(l = 0, 1; j = 1, . . . , J; k = 1, . . . , K).
The approximation to the decision rule is
When the propensity score is given, it does not play a role through the likelihood function, which is based on the conditional density for the distribution of Y given (X, D). That likelihood function depends only upon π. The propensity score enters through the prior distribution for π. If the prior distribution is dominated by the data, then there would not be value in knowing the propensity score. This corresponds to limit results in Hahn (1998) . But if the asymptotic approximation has K increasing as well as N , then knowing the propensity score could have value in the limit results.
Unknown Propensity Score
Now suppose that the propensity score is not given. From above, we have prior distributions for T 0 and for T 1 conditional on X = x, S = η. Suppose that the prior distribution for S conditional on X = x does not depend upon x. It has density p S which specifies that (S(k) : k = 1, . . . , K) are mutually independent with distributions in the beta family:
where γ 1 (k) > 0, γ 2 (k) > 0, and h Be (· | ζ 1 , ζ 2 ) is the beta density with parameter (ζ 1 , ζ 2 ):
For l = 0, 1, this prior distribution for S can be combined with the prior distribution for T l conditional on (X, S) to obtain the prior distribution for (T l , S) conditional on X = x (which in fact does not depend upon x). This prior distribution for (T l , S) conditional on X can be combined with the joint distribution for (Y (l) , D) conditional on (X = x; T l = π l , S = η) in (6) and (7) to obtain the posterior distribution for (T l , S) conditional on Z (l) = z (l) . The posterior density factors
The posterior density for
The posterior density for S(k) is
To evaluate the decision rule, we can use iterated expectations:
This only requires one-dimensional numerical integration, which can be done by quadrature. Then, given (β l , γ), the decision rule is
Let L (l) (β l , γ) denote the Type II likelihood function for (β l , γ):
It is given by
where c (l) (k; β l , γ) is in (24). The evaluation of this likelihood at any point (β l , γ) only requires the calculation of one-dimensional numerical integrals (there are K of them), which can be done by quadrature.
Suppose that γ 1 (k) and γ 2 (k) do not vary with k:
Then the (Type II) parameter space is
which has dimension JO + 2. A prior distribution on Λ l can be combined with the (Type II) likelihood function L (l) (β l , γ) to obtain a posterior distribution. Then we can integrate
with respect to this posterior distribution to obtain
and the decision rule
A potential approximation to this decision rule can be based on the maximum-likelihood (Type II) estimate of (β l , γ):
The approximation is
Another possibility is to use a separate limited-information approach for S, basing its posterior distribution on (X, D), so that
We can form a Type II likelihood function for γ:
The maximum-likelihood (Type II) estimate of γ = (γ 1 , γ 2 ) iŝ γ = arg max
Given γ, we can form a Type II likelihood function for β l , based on the distribution of
where c (l) (k; β l , γ) is in (24). Set γ =γ from (28) and obtain
Then a potential approximation for the decision rule in (26) is
SELECTION ON UNOBSERVABLES
Now we are going to drop the assumption of selection on observables. For individual i, we observe a vector of discrete variables, which is coded as W i ∈ {1, . . . , M }. W i will play the role of an instrumental variable. As before, there is assignment to one of two treatments:
There is a discrete outcome, which is coded as Y i ∈ {1, . . . , J}. We shall simplify notation by dropping the X variable. Either there are no observable characteristics for the data individuals, or we work with the subset that match the decision maker. Using individuals who do not match the decision maker involves issues similar to those discussed above. Let
Let W = (W 1 , . . . , W N ). We shall condition throughout on W , so its distribution will not play a role. The model for treatment assignment uses a latent variable V = (V 1 , . . . , V N ). Conditional on W = w = (w 1 , . . . , w N ), we have 
This distribution is unrestricted if λ is unrestricted, so that λ(m) can be any value in the interval
For example, we could have
where the operator E i provides the expectation with respect to the personal (subjective) distribution of individual i, and the function c maps {1,
suppose that (U 1 , . . . , U N ) are independent and identically distributed with distribution function G, which is continuous and strictly increasing. Then
and we want to allow V i to be correlated with (Y i0 , Y i1 ).
We shall assume that W i is randomly assigned in that
As before, in order to form a likelihood function, we do not need the joint distribution of (Y i0 , Y i1 ), just the two margins. We shall use the following model:
The functions h 0j and h 1j are given up to a parameter β. We could specify
where r 
Let z denote the realization of the random variable Z, with z i = (w i , d i , y i ), and let θ = (β, λ).
The likelihood function for the observation Z is
Suppose that the decision maker α is exchangeable with the data individuals in that the following sequence of random variables is exchangeable:
Then the marginal distributions of Y i0 and Y i1 are relevant for the decision maker, and we shall assume that:
Then, conditional on β, the decision rule is to choose
More generally, the decision maker could use some other distribution Q α and the decision rule
Suppose that i has a personal distribution H for (Y i0 , Y i1 , R i ), observes the signal R i that is related to (Y i0 , Y i1 ), and then forms
by using H to form the conditional distribution of Y i0 given R i and the conditional distribution of Y i1 given R i . Suppose this holds for i = 1, . . . , N and for the decision maker i = α, with the same personal distribution H. Before conditioning on Z, the decision maker observes R α and forms
using H to form the conditional distribution of Y α0 given R α and the conditional distribution of
, R i ) are independent and identically distributed according to some (unknown) distribution P , for i = α, 1, . . . , N . This implies that
is independent and identically distributed, and as above we let G denote the distribution function and assume it is continuous and strictly increasing. Let 
for some β ∈ Θ 1 . Then Q α would be the decision maker's posterior distribution for V α . Note that V α depends upon U α and G. The decision maker knows U α but he does not know G. Furthermore, G does not appear in the likelihood function, so there is no direct information on G in the data. In addition, this approach requires a detailed specification of what people knew and when they knew it. So a limited information approach may be appropriate, simply setting Q α equal to the uniform distribution.
A prior distribution for (β, λ) can be combined with the likelihood function in (32) to obtain a posterior distribution. The corresponding decision rule is obtained by integrating both sides of the inequality in (33) with respect to the posterior distribution for β. In general the prior distribution will not be dominated by the data. Nevertheless, it may be useful to have a reference decision rule that does not involve a numerical specification for the prior. One way to do this is to replace β in (33) byβ, a maximum-likelihood estimate:
Note that n(l, m, j).
So, if we can solve the following equations, we will obtain maximum-likelihood estimates:
An equivalent set of equations iŝ
Here we obtainλ(m) by forming the subgroup whose value for the instrumental variable is W i = m, and then calculate the fraction of this subgroup for which the treatment assignment is D i = 1. Then form the subgroup with W i = m and D i = l, and calculate the fraction of this subgroup with Y i = j.
Withλ(m) already determined, we try to solve forβ by matching the model's probabilities to these fractions.
Consider, for example, the specification for h lj in (31). We setλ(m) = n(1, m)/n(m) and try to solve
For each l ∈ {0, 1} and j ∈ {2, . . . , J} there are M equations and O unknowns in (β
lj ). So we do not expect a unique solution when O is greater than M . The nonuniqueness does not affect how well we "fit" the data, but different solutions for β imply different decision rules. One possibility is to set β
Then the prior is reflected in a careful choice of the basis elements r
To get a sense of the extrapolation that the model provides, we can make a connection with the role of compliers, always-takers, and never-takers in the local average treatment effect developed by Imbens and Angrist (1994) . Note that
Suppose that λ(m ) < λ(m ). Then we have
The condition that λ(m ) < V i < λ(m ) corresponds to the compliers. There is a direct estimate of the probability that Y i0 = j for compliers, in which the probabilities of observable events in (36) are replaced by sample frequencies:
We also have
The condition that λ(m ) < V i corresponds to the never-takers. There is a direct estimate of the probability that Y i0 = j for never-takers, using sample frequencies :
No direct estimate, however, is available for
which is the probability that Y i0 = j for always-takers. The role of the model is to provide an extrapolation for this term. An estimate of β is obtained by fitting the sample frequencies, and then h 0j (v;β) can be used to evaluate the integral in (37). Likewise, no direct estimate is available
which is the probability that Y i1 = j for never-takers. The model provides an extrapolation for this term, using h 1j (v;β) to evaluate the integral in (38).
CONNECTIONS WITH THE LITERATURE
Dehejia ( and that conditioning on only some part of the observed covariates may be preferable when making treatment choices. He uses a minimax regret criterion and develops bounds which give sufficient conditions on sample size in order for it to be optimal to condition treatment choices on all observed
covariates. This corresponds to my decision rule in (12), which does not use Good's (1965) Type II likelihood function. Stoye (2009) obtains exact results on minimax regret rules. In assigning treatment to an individual with covariate value x, only the subset of the data which matches that covariate value is used, no matter how small the subset. As the number of values that the discrete covariate can take on increases, a minimax regret rule approaches a no data rule. Angrist and Hahn (2004) are motivated by the result in Hahn (1998) that knowledge of the propensity score does not lower the semiparametric efficiency bound for the average treatment effect.
They say that (page 58): "In short, conventional asymptotic arguments would appear to offer no justification for anything other than full control for covariates in estimation of average treatment effects." They argue (page 58) that "...because covariate cells may be small or empty, in finite samples there is a cost to covariate matching, even if covariates are discrete and exact matching is feasible." They work with a multinomial covariate that takes K possible values, and they develop an alternative asymptotic approximation where cell sizes are fixed but the number of cells becomes infinitely large. They refer to this as "panel asymptotics," because of the similarity to large crosssection, small time-series asymptotics used with panel data models. Their treatment-assignment mechanism has a constant propensity score, so random assignment. They consider an estimator with full control for covariates (covariate matching) and one which ignores the covariates (matching on the propensity score, which is constant). In analogy with random effects estimators for panel data, they also consider a linear combination of these estimators, that is more efficient than either one under their asymptotic sequence. Their focus is on estimating an average treatment effect, whereas the decision problem in my paper is more related to a treatment effect for a particular covariate cell. Nevertheless, their panel data analogy is relevant for my paper and the Type II likelihood function can be given a random effects interpretation. Hirano and Porter (2008) develop an asymptotic theory explicitly for treatment choice. They establish an asymptotic optimality for Manski's (2004) conditional empirical success rule, in the case where a multinomial covariate takes on K possible values, where K is fixed as sample size N tends to infinity. It would be of interest to have results here under the Angrist-Hahn (2004) asymptotic sequence, where cell sizes are fixed and K tends to infinity. Rubin (1978) discusses the role of randomization in Bayesian inference for causal effects. In the case of selection on observables, where the treatment assignment D i is independent of the decision outcomes (Y i0 , Y i1 ) conditional on the measured characteristics X i (as in (4)), it follows from Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) that this independence holds conditional on the propensity score.
